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Davis: Mortgages for Future Advances in Florida
NOTES

MORTGAGES FOR FUTURE ADVANCES IN FLORIDA
The mortgage for future advances is basically one in which the
obligation is secured by the single, binding promise of the mortgagor,
made at the outset of the transaction, to pay back all sums advanced
presently and all advances which the mortgagee shall make by obligation or option, depending on the terms of the agreement, at some
future date or dates.' Such mortgages have always been recognized
by the common law, 2 and they are well established by the great weight
of authority in this country today. 3 Most jurisdictions, however, regulate or restrict their use by statute or by case decisions. 4
The future advance mortgage is a highly useful device in business
and industrial transactions with distinct advantages to both mortgagor and mortgagee. The mortgagor avoids paying the higher interest on the total amount of the debt until he actually needs it. He
further avoids the inconvenience and cost of refinancing the mortgage at a later time or the higher interest rates on secondary mortgages
to secure additional loans. The mortgagee also avoids the inconvenience of refinancing. Especially important in construction loans,
the mortgagee has the advantage of paying out the loan as the value
of the security increases, rather than making one single payment for
the full amount at the outset of the transaction with all the attendant
risks. 5
With Florida's continued industrial and business growth the mortgage for future advances has the potential of becoming an increasingly
important commercial device. It would seem worthwhile, therefore,
to examine some of the benefits and shortcomings of such a device
in Florida.
GENERAL

The treatise writers generally consider mortgages for future advances as to (1) form, that is, the specificity of the instrument, and
(2) type of advances, obligatory or optional.6
A mortgage for future advances may take one of two forms. It
may either state the total sum to be advanced as a present debt,7 or
it may expressly provide for advances without setting a limit. In
1.

OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §114 (1961).

1 JONES, MORTGAGES §448 (8th ed. 1928).
3. Note, Mortgages Securing Future Advances, 8 TEXAS L. REv. 372 (1930).
2.

4. Ibid.
5. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §113 (1951).
6. E.g., see 3 GLENN, MORTGAGES §§395, 397-98 (1943).
7. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §113 (1951). Although a mortgage that is worded as a
present debt may lend itself to fraud, which as a practical matter would be hard
to prove, the advances under such a mortgage are usually given priority. Priorities
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either form the mortgage is usually valid.8 However, some states
require both evidence of the future advance agreement and the limit
of advances to appear in the instrument. 9
The type of advances called for in the agreement is of critical
importance in determining whether an encumbrance that attached
after the recording of the original agreement has priority over advances made after the advancing mortgagee has notice of the encumbrance. In most jurisdictions the advancing mortgagee will prevail over subsequent liens or encumbrances if he is obligated to make
the advances, regardless of notice. 10 However, nearly all jurisdictions
subordinate optional advances made after actual notice of an encumbrance." The authorities disagree about the priorities of optional
12
advances when the notice of intervening liens is constructive.
The general law, however, is of little use in any particular jurisdiction, except perhaps to fill gaps in the local law. When a problem
of priorities of advances is encountered, one must consider primarily
the statutes dealing expressly with future advances, the court decisions,
and the statutes in related areas, such as the recording and relevant
tax statutes.'
SECTION 697.04 OF FLORIDA STATUTES 1961
Section 697.04 is a very comprehensive statute which will protect
the advancing mortgagee for all amounts advanced up to the principal
should depend on the equities of the parties involved, not strictly on the form of
the agreement. If a junior lienor examines the record and discovers a prior mortgage
for say, $50,000, the agreement worded as a present debt, when actually the mortgage is one for future advances with only S30,000 remaining on the debt, he will
probably not be heard to complain. If, however, the first mortgagee advances
S20,000, after the junior lien has been recorded, bringing the debt back to the
original amount, the junior lienor may argue that he is now subordinated until
the mortgagor has paid a total of $70,000, S20,000 more than appears on the face
of the mortgage agreement. This may be true, but the answer to that is that at
no time will he, the junior lienor, be subordinated for more than the face amount
of the mortgage, and he had notice of this when the first mortgage was recorded.
On the other hand, if the junior lienor is an existing creditor this reply is unsatisfactory. But the business advantages of the "present-debt" form outweigh
these objections.
8. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §116 (1951).
9. Ibid.
10. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §120 (1951).
11. 1 JONES, MORTGAGES §453 (8th ed. 1928).
12. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages §250 (1949).
13. Subsection 199.11 (5) (c) of Florida Statutes 1961, is a detailed subsection
setting forth the provisions for payment of intangible tax on a future advance
mortgage agreement. The subsection requires the payment of taxes on the initial
debt, if any, when the mortgage is executed, and thereafter each time advances
are made on all sums advanced. Failure to pay the tax does not affect the priorit,
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amount stated in the mortgage. The statute gives a mortgage for obligatory or optional future advances, within its purview, priority over all
14
subsequent liens, regardless of notice to the advancing mortgagee:
"Hereafter, any mortgage ... may secure not only existing indebtedness but also such future advances, whether obligatory or
otherwise, as are made within twenty years from the date thereof, to the same extent as if such future advances were made on
the date of the execution of such mortgage ...

although there

may be no .indebtedness outstanding at the time any advance is
made. Such lien, as to third persons without actual notice thereof, shall be valid as to all such indebtedness and future advances from the time the mortgage . . . is filed for record as

provided by law."
The statute, as it relates to obligatory advances, is in accord with most
authority in the United States, 15 and is generally declaratory of the
prior case law in Florida. However, the protection afforded optional
advances is greater than that afforded by the common law.
When first enacted in 1941,16 section 697.04 was limited to the
securing of advances for agricultural loans only. Apparently, lenders
dealing primarily in agricultural loans requested the legislation, and
it was felt that the proposal would have a better chance for passage
if its scope was limited.17 The mortgage for future advances in the
agricultural loan area was very desirable,"" and it has continued to
serve as an effective means of obtaining security.
of any lien given under the mortgage, but failure to pay is a misdemeanor, and
the mortgage cannot be enforced until the tax is paid.
14. FLA. STAT. §697.04 (1) (1961).
15. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §120 (1951).
16. Fla. Laws 1941, ch. 20846, §§1-3, at 2291.
17. Letter From R. M. Sasnett, Jr., Assistant Counsel to The Federal Land
Bank of Columbia, Columbia, South Carolina to Dewey A. Dye, Esquire, Oct. 24,
1962. The Federal Land Bank of Columbia helped draft Senate Bill 330 which
Mr. Dye introduced in the Florida Senate on April 30, 1941. The bill became section 697.04 of the Florida Statutes, 1941, when enacted. See Journal of the Senate,
State of Florida, 1941, at 197.
18. Letter From Dewey A. Dye, Esquire to author, Oct. 15, 1962: "At that
period of time [1941] there were a great many local co-operative marketing
organizations handling agricultural products and their grower members were
securing mortgage financing each year through such organizations as primary
lenders, which under the set-up then existing involved a mortgage to the local
association which, in turn, assigned it to a local financing group organized by
the same people and this group, in turn, assigned the mortgage to some instrumentality of the government to secure funds to pass on to the initial borrower.
Then, when the loan was finally paid, the mortgage was reassigned back through
the various organizations which had handled it on the way up and then satisfied.
involved a great
This was a process initiated and consummated each year and .
deal of paper work, recording expense and abstract expense."
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Section 697.04 originally provided that the advances made under
the agreement had to be made within six years of the date of the
instrument covering the agreement. The time limit was extended to
ten years in 1953,19 and to twenty years in 1961.20 The 1953 amendment also expanded the section to cover "loans of any other character" as well as the agricultural loans originally provided for. It was
felt that expanding the statutory protection to all loans would revolutionize real estate lending practices by enabling the borrower to
refinance his partially retired obligation at a minimum of cost, and
at the time there was no particular reason to limit the section solely
to agricultural loans.21 The 1961 amendment extending the time for
advances was apparently intended to make the statute conform more
closely with business practices and to avert refinancing costs on mortgages ten years of age.2 2 As will be seen later, however, the priorities
the federal government has given its tax liens over future advances,
state laws notwithstanding, have diminished the desirability of using
future advance agreements which might otherwise be expected.
It is interesting to note that "any mortgages, shipping contracts,
or other instruments made and given by naval stores operators and
producers to secure existing loans and future advances by naval
stores factors ' ' 23 have been expressly excluded from the operation
of the section throughout its history. The statutes and the legislative histories give no indication as to the reasons for this exclusion.
The exclusion was probably requested by the naval stores industry
24
because of the particular financing normally employed.
The desirability of the statute cannot be gainsaid, but it leaves
much to conjecture and the cases are of little help. The problems
involved in determining just how far the parties must go to comply
with the requirements of the statute are discussed below.
FORM OF THE MORTGAGE

The form of the mortgage may determine whether advances have
priority over intervening liens. Three basic possibilities exist: (1)
The mortgage is within the purview of section 697.04 and the advances take priority, whether obligatory or optional, regardless of
19. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28116, §1, at 391.
20. Fla. Laws 1961, ch. 61-135, §§1-2, at 233.
21. Letter From Florida Representative Frank Fee, to author, Oct. 16, 1962.
Representative Fee introduced the amendment as House Bill 814. See Journal
of the House of Representatives, State of Florida, 1953, at 311.
22. Letter From Florida Senator Wilson Carraway to author, Oct. 11, 1962.
Senator Carraway introduced the 1961 amendment as Senate Bill 140. See Journal
of the Senate, State of Florida, 1961, at 68.
23. FLA. STAT. §§697.04 (1)- (2) (1961).
24. Letter From Florida Senator Wilson Carraway supra note 22.
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notice; (2) the mortgage does not comply with the statute and the
question of priorities must be determined by the common law; or
(3) the mortgage does not comply with the statute and is void in its
entirety.
Protection of advances under the statute is the most desirable of
the above possibilities. The mortgagee should insure that the form
of the mortgage complies with section 697.04. Unfortunately, the
statute contains some troublesome language and the two cases decided
since its enactment do not provide a satisfactory judicial interpretation. No difficulties should arise if the parties expressly state the terms
of the agreement, including an express provision for future advances,
the type of advances, and the maximum amount to be advanced. But
such specificity may be impractical or the necessary care may be
lacking.
Subsection 697.04(1) expressly requires only that the maximum
principal amount must be set out in the mortgage, and that the total
unpaid balance shall not exceed the maximum at any one time. It
was felt at one time25 that subsection 697.04 (1) might well have been
intended by the legislature to mean that future advances must be expressly provided for in the mortgage. A recent case, however, indicates that no such requirement exists when the advances are obligatory.
2G
In Simpson v. Simpson the mortgage provided:

"That the said Mortgagor, for and in consideration of the sum
of Ten Thousand Dollars, to him in hand paid by the said
Mortgagee, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, has
granted [certain lands) ...
Further, the parties stipulated: 27
"That at the time of the execution of said note and mortgage,
no part of the Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) was paid or
delivered to the said M. C. Simpson, but it was agreed by and
between the plaintiff and M. C. Simpson, that the plaintiff
should pay and deliver the Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00)
to him upon his request or demand for the $10,000.00."
Notice that no language in the mortgage indenture itself shows
that the mortgage was for future advances; in fact, "to him in hand
paid" gives the distinct impression that the sum was paid concurrently with the execution of the mortgage and the note.2 8 Neverthe25.

Title Note 27-57, FLORIDA LA,vWns' TrrLE GUARANTY FUND.

26. 123 So. 2d 289, 293 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
27. 123 So. 2d at 293.
28. One question that comes to mind is, why, in a situation like the Simpson
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less, the court upheld the mortgage as a valid future advance agree29
ment but noted some limitations:
"The rule generally supported is that it is not essential to the
validity of a mortgage to secure future advances that the mortgage disclose such purpose on the fact thereof . .. . The rule

has even been held to prevail where the mortgage purports to
be for a present loan. A similar result has been reached as
against owners of interests subsequently acquired, who are not
prejudiced by such absence of disclosure. In this connection, it
has been declared not to be inequitable to give effect to a mortgage to secure future advances, which does not disclose such
purpose on its face, where the mortgage is otherwise fair and
where it gives such information that by an inspection of the
record and by the exercise of common prudence and ordinary
diligence, the extent of the encumbrance may be ascertained.
Of course, the omission to state the object subjects the mortgage
to suspicion and the mortgagee to strict proof."
However, some language in subsection 697.04 (2) regarding optional advance agreements raises a perplexing problem: "[Aldvances
to be made at the option of the lender, under the terms of such mortgage . . . shall be valid ......(Emphasis added.)

Does "terms oI

such mortgage" mean that the optional agreement has to be spelled
out in the instrument itself, thus imposing a limitation that is apparently not required under subsection 697.04 (1)? If it is imposing
a limitation, why is the language "whether obligatory or otherwise"
used in subsection 697.04 (1)? Or is the purpose of subsection 697.04 (2)
to create a new right in the optional agreement against "creditors or
subsequent purchasers" which might not otherwise be implied in
subsection 697.04 (1)? The point is belabored because parties wishing
to enter an optional mortgage agreement and relying on the general
wording of subsection 697.04 (1) and the Simpson decision may find
case, do courts concern themselves with future advances? There is nothing in the
report of the case to indicate that the parties to the mortgage regarded it as any

more than a present transaction, with the fulfillment of the mortgagee's duty still
executory. Nevertheless, the court unmistakably reached its decision on the pre-

mise that it was dealing with a future advance situation. The writer was unable
to find a case or treatise that delineates at what point a future advance mortgage
begins and the present mortgage transaction departs when only a single payment
is involved. The fact stipulation in the Simpson case provided that the mortgagee
would pay the sum of the loan upon "request or demand." Perhaps it is enough

to call a mortgage one for a future advance, even though it is worded as a present
debt, if somewhere in the transaction the parties contemplate that the amount of

the loan is not necessarily expected to be paid immediately, immediately contemplating normal procedural delays such as recording, depositing extra funds to
cover the amount of the loan, and so forth.
29.

123 So. 2d at 293.
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a false sense of security in the two if they do not clearly spell out
the terms of the agreement in the mortgage itself. This is not to
suggest that the Simpson decision goes too far; liberality in future
mortgage agreements, particularly when the advances are obligatory,
is to be encouraged wherever possible. It is to suggest, however, that
some wording in section 697.04 is subject to a dual interpretation
regarding optional advances, and if carelessness attends the drawing
up of an optional agreement the parties are bargaining for litigation,
the outcome of which is far from certain.
The only other case 30 dealing with future advances since the enactment of section 697.04 sheds little light on this consideration. The
Florida Supreme Court acknowledged the validity of future advance
agreements, and with the customary elucidation it has shown in this
area said only further that "section 697.04 . . . limits the scope of

3
provisions for future advances." 31
In 1939, in Bullard v. Fender, the leading Florida case on optional
32
future advances, the supreme court, quoting Jones, said:

"If the mortgage contains enough to show a contract between
the parties, that it is to stand as a security to the mortgagee for
such indebtedness as may arise from the future dealings between the parties, it is sufficient to put a purchaser or incumbrancer on inquiry, and if he fails to make it he is not entitled
to protection as a bona fide purchaser."
One earlier Florida decision 33 held that, in the absence of a statute,
the debt need not be definitely set out in the mortgage agreement if
described "with reasonable certainty and within limitations so that
[it] . . . may be ascertained by the exercise of ordinary diligence on
proper inquiry."34 The same case held that parol evidence was admissible to show that a mortgage was for future advances, thus presenting a favorable argument for not requiring the agreement to be
set out in the instrument. This does not resolve, however, the question whether the agreement must be set out in all cases to meet the
statute.
Based on the limited number of statements and cases quoted above
the trend pretty clearly seems to allow a mortgage that does not
expressly state that it is for future advances to stand if the intent of
the parties is dear. It should be remembered, though, that these
statements are few and the Florida courts have yet to be faced
squarely with the problem of optional advances made under the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Downing v. First Nat'l Bank, 81 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1955).
Id. at 488.
140 Fla. 448, 461, 192 So. 167, 172 (1939).
McEwen v. Growers' Loan & Guar. Co., 104 Fla. 176, 139 So. 805 (1932).
Id. at 192, 139 So. at 811.
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statute. Reliance on past decisions in such a case might be improvident.
Unless other circumstances warrant it, such as fraud, a finding
that a mortgage for future advances that failed to comply with section
697.04 is void would be a harsh one, requiring a very narrow interpretation of the statute. In fact, Maryland is the only state that apparently goes to the extreme of finding mortgages for future advances
3
3
that do not comply with the statute void, 5 but the Maryland statute r
expressly requires that the future advance agreement appear on the
face of the instrument.
Of course, some combination of the three basic possibilities may
arise. If the future advance agreement complied in every respect
with section 697.04, except that the loan was for a number of years
in excess of the twenty years permitted by the statute, a court could
find that (1) the agreement is protected by the statute for twent'
years and either void or under the common law for the remaining
years, or (2) the agreement is not protected by the statute at all and
is either under the common law or void. In a time when twenty-five
and thirty year mortgages are commonplace this situation would appear to present a practical source of potential difficulty. Subsection
697.04 (1) states, in part, that "any mortgage . .. may secure ... such
future advances, whether obligatory or otherwise, as are made within
twenty years from the date thereof." Out of context this subsection
sheds very little light on what the prospect for a mortgage in excess
of twenty years is. But subsection 697.04 (2) says that optional advances "shall be valid only as to such advances as are to be made
within twenty years from the date of such mortgage .... " The latter
subsection strongly suggests that after the statutory time has elapsed,
at least as far as optional advances are concerned, further advances
will be subordinated to intervening liens. Although the advancing
mortgagee would apparently have protection for the statutory time,
he may be inviting disaster to make advances after the twenty years,
at least as far as maintaining any protection by way of priority for
his funds.
The question whether the mortgagee could argue that the mortgage was a valid one for the full period under the common law, thus
relying on prior decisions to determine the question of priorities, has
not been answered by the Florida courts. Even if the question were
answered in the affirmative many difficulties would still remain, as
will be seen.

5.
36.

High Grade Brick Co. v. Amos, 95 Md. 571, 53 Atl. 148 (1902).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 66, §2 (1957).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss4/6

8

Davis: Mortgages for Future Advances in Florida
NOTES
EFFECT OF AFTER ACQUIRED LIENS WHEN FUTURE

ADVANCES ARE OBLIGATORY
3
In 1927, in Guaranty Title & Trust Co. v. Thompson, 7 the Florida
Supreme Court, in distinguishing a mortgage for obligatory future
38
advances from a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage, said:
"[T]he general rule is that such a mortgage takes priority as
a lien from the date of its record, and not from the date of the
disbursements by the mortgagee to the mortgagor for the full
amount of the indebtedness actually and in good faith incurred
under and secured by the mortgage, not exceeding, however,
the maximum amount the mortgagee is obligated to loan or

advance by the terms of the mortgage .... Such mortgage is a

potential lien for the full amount the mortgagee is obligated
to advance under its terms."
This is the only expression by the Florida Supreme Court on the
effect of clearly obligatory advances on later liens. The court makes
it clear that once the mortgage is recorded it will prevail over liens

that are prior in time to later advances.
The recent Simpson case,39 discussed previously, indicates that the
statute is in harmony with prior law on obligatory advances. Decedent, a single man, gave his mother a mortgage on his house as security for a promissory note for $10,000, but none of the $10,000 was
advanced at that time. The mortgage was properly recorded. The
decedent married and established his homestead on the mortgaged
property a short time later, and less than a month thereafter the decedent's mother paid the $10,000 obligation. The decedent's wife
did not join in the mortgage or the note, and the mother acknowledged that she knew the property secured by the mortgage was a
homestead when she paid the $10,000. After the death of the decedent,
the mother brought suit to enforce her mortgage lien against the
homestead property. The decedent's widow argued that no lien attached until after the mortgagee paid the $10,000, or after the homestead had been established. The court held that the recorded mortgage
was a valid lien against the homestead, and declared that the mortgagee who is obligated to make future advances "will take precedence
over any subsequent incumbrance given by the mortgagor, although
notice of such incumbrance at the time the
he may have actual
40
made.."
is
advance
37.
38.
39.
40.

93 Fla. 983, 113 So. 117 (1927).
Id. at 990, 113 So. at 120.
Simpson v. Simpson, 123 So. 2d 289 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
Id. at 292.
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It would seem safe to conclude that in Florida a mortgage for
obligatory future advances, properly recorded, will, by statute and
decision, take priority over all subsequent liens, regardless of notice
to the mortgagee before or after advances are made.
EFFECT OF AFTER ACQUIRED LIENS WHEN FUTURE
ADVANCES ARE OPTIONAL

Unfortunately, the priority of a subsequent lienor and the mortgagee that makes optional advances after notice of the intervening
lien has not been satisfactorily settled by the Florida courts. If the
mortgage complies with section 697.04, optional advances are given
preferred status, as was pointed out earlier, and the advancing mortgagee is protected, regardless of notice. This is contrary to the majority view in this country4l which will protect optional advances only
until such time as the mortgagee has actual notice of intervening
liens. The protection that the statute affords optional advances is
also in derogation of pre-1941 cases. An examination of the cases will
reveal the Florida courts' inconsistency in dealing with optional advances.
In 1925, in Flynn-Harris-BullardCo. v. Johnson,42 the complainant

sought to impress four liens for labor rendered on the defendant
turpentine producer's property. The other defendant claimed, as
mortgagee, the prior lien of a mortgage to secure future advances.
The mortgage was dated November 7, 1919, and provided that the
"mortgagee shall not be bound to advance more than the sum of
$16,000 in any event to be owing at one time . . . .43 The services
claimed under the laborers' liens were rendered in 1920 and 1921.
Although the actual dates on which advances were made are not a
part of the record, the language of the decision makes it implicit
that some of the advances were made after the rendition of the
services.
In upholding the priority of the mortgage the court found that
the mortgagee had no actual notice of the laborers' liens prior to the
advancement of the $16,000 and, therefore, should prevail. In arriving at this holding the court cited section 369 of Jones which
44
states:
"But where the mortgagee is not bound to make the advances or
assume the liabilities and he has actual notice of a later incumbrance upon the property for an existing debt or liability, such
41.

1 JONES, MORTGAGES §453 (8th ed. 1928).

42.
43.

90 Fla. 654, 107 So. 358 (1925).
Id. at 657, 107 So. at 360.
1 JONFS, IORTGAGES §369 (7th ed. 1915). (Emphasis added.)

44.
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later incumbrances will take precedence of the mortgage as to
all advances made after such notice."
This case agrees with the majority view and is exactly what might
be expected in a jurisdiction that has no statute expressly providing
for future advances, as was the case in Florida in 1925.
It will be recalled that in Guaranty Title & Trust Co.,45 decided
two years later, the Florida Supreme Court used unequivocal language
in stating that the mortgage for obligatory future advances has
priority over later encumbrances upon recordation. The court was
contrasting such mortgages with a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage which it held would, although previously recorded, take effect
as a lien against third persons without notice only from the time
the debt or obligation secured by it is created, and be without vitality
as a present lien until the creation of such debt or obligation. The
court made no mention of optional future advance agreements, but to
support its definition of a trust deed in the form of a mortgage cited
two cases" which Osborne treats47 as leading cases representing a
strict minority view that in an optional future advance agreement
the mortgage is void until an advance is actually made because before
then there is no debt to secure. This view charges the mortgagee with
constructive notice of later liens and, in effect, requires him to search
the record before he makes each advance. Whether the court intended
to rely on these cases just to illustrate operation of the trust deed in
the form of a mortgage is not clear. However, it can be fairly inferred
that the court was, at least by implication, equating the types of
agreements by its failure to distinguish them, which implies a shift
from a clear approval of the majority view toward at least a tacit
acknowledgement and approval of a strict minority view in two years.
In Bullard v. Fender,48 mentioned previously, the court was presented with a choice opportunity to resolve any doubts involving
priorities of optional advances by decidedly adopting a single view.
Instead, it added more fuel to the fire of confusion. Citing Pomeroy's
49
Equity Jurisprudencethe court said:
"The prior mortgage [for future advances], therefore, duly recorded, has a preference over subsequent recorded mortgages or
conveyances, or subsequent docketed judgments, not only for

45. 93 Fla. 983, 113 So. 117 (1927).
46. Ladue v. Detroit 8=Milwaukee R.R., 13 Mich. 380, 87 Am. Dec. 759 (1865);
Freutel v. Schmitz, 299 Ill. 320, 132 N.E. 534 (1921). Cited at 93 Fla. 991, 113 So.
120.
47. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES §§103, 114 (1951).
48. 140 Fla. 448, 192 So. 167 (1939).
49. Id. at 459, 192 So. at 171. (Emphasis added.)
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advances previously made, but also for advances made after
their recording or docketing without notice thereof."
Further in the opinion the court cites, with apparent approval, a
famous Mississippi case, 50 which represents a popular minority view,
holding that, regardless of notice, a mortgage for future advances,
optional or obligatory, properly recorded will prevail over all subsequent liens. Jones also is extensively quoted to the effect that:31
"IT]here is strong reason and authority for the rule that a
mortgage to secure future advances ... whether the mortgagee
be bound to make the advances or not, will prevail over the
supervening claims of purchasers or creditors, as to all advances
made within the terms of such mortgage, whether made before
or after the claims of such purchasers or creditors arose, or
before or after the mortgagee had notice of them."
The court did not elaborate on the type of notice it meant to
infer from either of the quotations, and the record of the case is
silent on the matter. The two authorities are still impossible to
reconcile in this context because both strongly indicate that they
are referring to actual notice but they reach opposite hypotheses. In
fact, the late Selden Waldo noted that the source material from
Pomeroy showed that the author intended actual notice. - The
pertinent section of Jones5 3 contains no elaboration as to type of
notice, although the implication seems clear that the writer meant
any form of notice, actual or otherwise.
The facts of the Bullard case afford no clarification as to the view
or theory the court wished to adopt. The court sustains the priorit)
of an optional advance mortgage and advances made thereunder over
a mortgage of the complainant, even though advances were made
under the first mortgage after recording of the second mortgage,
without deciding the question of notice. All the parties to the litigation were engaged in the manufacture of turpentine and had interrelated business dealings, so it might be fairly inferred that there was
actual notice of the plaintiff's mortgage, but the fact remains that the
court did not decide the issue on this basis and the parties did not
raise it.
Mr. Waldo cited the Bullard case as an apparent adoption by the
supreme court of the more liberal view set forth in the quotation
from Jones above, but cautioned against reliance on the case with
50. Witczinski v. Everman, 51 Miss. 841 (1876).
51. Bullard v. Fender, supra note 48, at 460, 192 So. at 172. (Emphas;is added.)
52. Waldo, The Effect of After Acquired Liens Upon Mortgages for Future
Advances, 22 FLA. L.J. 58, 60 (1948).

53.

1 JONES,

MORTGAGES

§457 (8th ed. 1928).
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NOTES
regards to optional advances until further clarification from the
Florida courts. Unfortunately, his analysis overlooks the Flynn-HarrisBullard Co. case and the two cases cited in the Guaranty Title &
Trust Co.
What is even more troubling, the court totally ignored the two
previous Florida cases in the Bullard decision. Admittedly, it may
be stretching the point to suggest that the Florida Supreme Court impliedly approved the theory that a mortgage for future advances is
void until an advance is actually made merely by citing two cases
which so hold to support its definition of a trust deed in the form of
a mortgage. But to disregard or overlook a case of first impression,
which dealt squarely with a mortgage for optional future advances,
is something else again. Prudent counsel certainly will not rely on
the Bullard decision if framing a mortgage for optional future advances, but then what can he rely on? Fortunately, most of the foregoing should be made academic by the statute, but it should provide
stimulus for insuring that the optional agreement is within the protection of section 697.04.
FEDERAL TAX LIENS

Despite state laws that give future advances priority over later
encumbrances the unmistakable trend in the federal and state courts
is to give recorded federal tax liens priority over later advances even
though such advances are secured by an earlier recorded mortgage
and would have priority under state law. It becomes necessary, therefore, to consider the priorities of federal liens entirely apart from
liens governed by state law.
The impetus for the courts to give the federal liens priority probably stems from Revenue Ruling 56-41, 54 which states in part:
"In the case of an 'open-end' mortgage which covers future
advances, it is possible that no future advance may ever be
made. Therefore, until such an advance is actually made, there
can be no fixed and specific or perfected lien under Federal
law as distinguished from a mere contingent lien or 'caveat of
a more perfect lien to come.' Consequently, an intervening
recorded Federal tax lien has priority over advances made
subsequent to the date of such recording."
The term "open-end" connotes an optional advance agreement,
and it is not properly used in conjunction with a mortgage for obligatory advances s 5
54. 1956-1 CuM. BuLL. 562.
55. Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 Mo. L. Rav. 209
(1956).
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The relative priority of United States tax liens is a federal question, 56 and to subordinate a federal lien the competing lien must be
perfected and prior in time. To be perfected it must meet the test
of the "inchoate and general lien" doctrine by being definite in
identity of lienor, in the property subject to lien, and in the amount
of the lien.37
A recent Washington case 58 is illustrative. The mortgage was
given "in consideration of further advances to be made," but no
maximum amount was stipulated. The Washington Supreme Court
acknowledged the validity of future advance agreements under the
laws of Washington, stating that all advances made under such an
agreement relate back in priority to the date of the mortgage. But
when the court applied the federal test, it decided that because of
the lack of certainty when the federal lien attached that any advances
would ever be made, the subsequent advances must give way to the
federal liens.
Washington does not have a statute expressly providing for future
advances as does Florida, but this would seem to matter little if the
federal test must be applied. Even if an optional advance agreement
specified the maximum amount of indebtedness to be outstanding at
any one time, as provided in subsection 697.04 (2), it is possible that
"no future advances may ever be made." It would seem, therefore,
a foregone conclusion that federal liens will prevail when the advances
are truly optional, and consequently inchoate at the time of recording
of the federal lien. This is not to be confused, however, with advances
made before the federal lien is recorded. These advances meet the
test and take priority5 9
No cases have been found in which the priority of obligatory advances and federal liens has been determined. On the face of it, the
obligatory liens meet the test laid down, and it would seem only
reasonable to expect obligatory future advances under a prior recorded mortgage to prevail. Reasonableness, however, is not a constant virtue of the Internal Revenue Service, and until the question
is answered the advancing mortgagee should be aware of the potential
dilemma of being obligated to make advances after a federal tax lien
has attached to his security.

56. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). See
United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United States v.
Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
57. Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
58. American Sur. Co. v. Sundberg, 58 Wash. 2d 337, 363 P.2d 99 (1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962).
59. United States v. L.R. Foy Constr. Co., 300 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1962).
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NO TES
CONCLUSION

The cases discussed represent all the reported case law on future
advance mortgages in Florida. From these cases it seems fairly safe
to conclude that the obligatory advance mortgage will prevail in
every reasonable situation, and with the further protection of the
statute its position becomes virtually unassailable. Until further
clarification by the courts or the legislature the optional advance
mortgage, unless the agreement is expressly stated on the face of the
instrument, is in a more tenuous situation. The mortgagee that has
doubts whether his agreement is protected by the statute should examine the record prior to making any advances, and whenever possible he should obtain a waiver from a subsequent attaching encumbrancer. With the added onus of the priority of federal liens the
advantages of the optional mortgage all but disappear.
It is to be hoped that federal legislation will be passed that will
require cognizance of, if not deference to, state property laws in
dealing with future advance mortgage agreements, in order to retain
their potential usefulness. If federal liens were given priority in accordance with state laws the stimulus that could be added to the commercial employment of these forms of agreement might very likely
offset in commercial tax revenue the advantages to be gained by the
present arbitrariness used by the Treasury in collecting tax deficiencies.
More pertinent and feasible, however, is the legislation that could
be passed in Florida to remove any doubts about the requirements
that the parties to a future advance mortgage must meet to protect
their interests, thus increasing the usefulness of these mortgages to the
extent possible.
Perhaps one of the simplest and most effective ways to serve notice
that a mortgage is for future advances would be to add a section to
the present statute similar to the one dealing with balloon mortgages. 0
Such a section could require that the words THIS MORTGAGE IS
FOR FUTURE ADVANCES, or words to a similar effect, be printed
or stamped across the face of the mortgage deed. This procedure
would clearly put third parties on notice as to what kind of agreement they were dealing with, whether it be as a purchaser or subsequent encumbrancer, and not allow them to complain of lack of
knowledge, or of alleged inequities if their lien is subordinated to later
advances. Another method would be an amendment stating whether
the future advance agreement must be expressly set forth in the instrument itself.

60.

FLA. STAT.

§697.05 (2) (1961).
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